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This paper explores the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and the
productivity of host country domestic firms. We rely on a specially designed survey of
over 4000 manufacturing firms in Vietnam, and separate out productivity gains along the
supply chain (obtained through direct transfers of knowledge/technology between linked
firms) from productivity effects through indirect FDI spillovers. In addition to identifying
indirect vertical productivity spillovers from FDI, our results show that there are
productivity gains associated with direct linkages between foreign-owned and domestic
firms along the supply chain not captured by commonly used measures of spillovers. This
includes evidence of productivity gains through forward linkages for domestic firms
which receive inputs from foreign-owned firms.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is a significant policy priority in developing countries. This is so with a view to
creating jobs and injecting capital into the domestic economy. Moreover, FDI often comes with new technologies and
innovations. They are potentially an important source of productivity growth as they may help host country domestic
industries catch up with the international technology frontier. Given the policy attention and resources invested by
governments in attempting to attract FDI, establishing whether there is positive evidence of externalities or productivity
spillovers from FDI has become the topic of a vast and influential empirical literature.
The basic premise underlying the existence of FDI spillovers is that foreign-invested firms are technologically superior
and that knowledge is transferred through their interactions with domestic firms, which, in turn, leads to productivity
improvements.1 There are many well-explored mechanisms through which such spillovers may be realised. Horizontal, or
intra-sector, spillovers are those that result from knowledge and technology used by FDI firms transferred to competinger B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
.
, john.rand@econ.ku.dk (J. Rand), ttalbot@cgdev.org (T. Talbot), Finn.Tarp@econ.ku.dk (F. Tarp).
Markusen and Venables (1999) for seminal work on the theoretical underpinnings of productivity
C. Newman et al. / European Economic Review 76 (2015) 168–187 169firms in the same sector. Vertical, or inter-sector, spillovers are those that transfer through the supply chain from foreign
intermediate suppliers to domestic producers or more commonly from foreign-invested firms to domestic input suppliers.
Most of the recent literature in developing country contexts finds no evidence of horizontal spillovers and emphasizes
vertical spillovers through backward linkages from foreign firms to domestic suppliers as the main source of productivity
effects (see, for example, Blalock and Gertler, 2008; Javorcik, 2004; Kugler, 2006). The available evidence also suggests that
the type of the foreign investor, whether a joint venture or a wholly foreign-owned firm, matters for the extent of spillovers
(Javorcik, 2004).2 Overall, however, the empirical literature is inconclusive as to the nature and extent of FDI spillovers. This
is highlighted in review papers by Görg and Greenaway (2004) and Görg and Srobl (2001); and conclusions drawn largely
depend on the specific country context, the data used, and the methods applied.
In his overview of the literature on FDI spillovers in developing countries, Smeets (2008) points out that technology
transfers and technology spillovers are distinct, albeit related, concepts, which should be treated as such in empirical
analysis. The Giroud et al. (2012) criticism of the current literature is that it focuses on externalities from FDI rather than on
identifying the direct effects of linkages between foreign and domestic firms. In this paper we address both of these issues
by considering (i) the extent to which direct linkages between domestic and foreign firms lead to productivity
improvements and (ii) whether such linkages explain FDI spillovers. In other words, we separate out productivity spillovers
from FDI that are due to direct linkages from other externalities.
We use panel data from a specially designed survey of over 4000 manufacturing firms in Vietnam covering the 2009–
2012 period. It allows us to directly identify supply chain linkages and technology transfers between foreign and domestic
firms, using a two stage econometric approach. In the first stage we estimate productivity, and subsequently we explore the
relationship between productivity and direct and indirect spillovers from FDI.
Our results provide evidence for positive indirect productivity spillovers from FDI firms in downstream sectors. Similarly,
there is strong evidence to suggest that a dominance of foreign firms upstream has a negative impact on the productivity of
downstream domestic firms. While these results are broadly consistent with the existing body of empirical evidence, our
analysis adds a new dimension to the understanding of the nature of these spillovers. We find that direct forward linkages
from foreign-invested input suppliers to domestic customers are positively related to productivity. Moreover, having a direct
link with an upstream FDI firm (where the link is associated with a technology transfer) mitigates part of the negative
externality from the dominance of wholly-foreign owned firms in upstream sectors. Our findings suggest that the standard
measures used in the literature to capture FDI spillovers do not adequately account for the effects of direct linkages or
technology transfers between foreign and domestic firms.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of related literature and some
background on the Vietnamese context. Section 3 outlines the empirical approach, while Section 4 describes the data.
Section 5 presents results, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Related literature and country context
The argument for state intervention to attract foreign investors hinges in part on the existence of positive externalities.
Technology externalities from FDI can occur through a number of different mechanisms (see Blalock and Gertler (2008),
Kugler (2006) and Javorcik (2004) for concise overviews of the various channels). Horizontal spillovers within sectors may
arise when workers move from foreign-invested firms to domestic firms, bringing with them knowledge learned. Similarly,
domestic firms may observe foreign-invested firms operating in their sector and copy the technologies used. It is generally
agreed, however, that intra-industry externalities of this kind are unlikely to exist. Within sectors, foreign-invested firms
compete with domestic firms and so have every incentive to prevent their embodied knowledge and technologies from
leaking to their domestic competitors (Javorcik, 2004). Indeed, there is a large body of empirical literature that has been
unable to find robust evidence for productivity gains accruing to domestic firms through horizontal spillovers.3
In contrast, spillovers between sectors may be more likely to occur. Spillovers through vertical linkages are desirable if
the productivity gains exceed those internalized through deliberate arrangements between domestic and foreign firms.
Fig. 1 illustrates how technology spillovers from foreign firms to domestic firms in other sectors are defined.
Backward spillovers occur when domestic firms experience productivity improvements as a result of an increase in the
presence of foreign firms in downstream sectors. Such spillovers are most likely to occur where there are direct backward
linkages, i.e. when domestic firms that supply inputs to foreign-owned firms experience productivity improvements. This
may happen through a number of different channels, the most likely being deliberate knowledge transfers from foreign
firms to domestic input suppliers.4 It is also possible that firms which are not directly linked with foreign firms downstream
might experience productivity improvements. This could be due to domestic suppliers having greater incentives to improve
the quality of their inputs or the efficiency with which they are provided due to increased competition for foreign2 There is also a literature that explores the extent to which the absorptive capacity of firms matters for the realization of spillovers (Giroud et al., 2012;
Marin and Bell, 2006).
3 For recent examples see Barrios et al. (2011), Blalock and Gertler (2008), Bwaly (2006), Damijan et al. (2008), Javorcik (2004), and Kugler (2006), all of
whom find no evidence of horizontal spillovers.
4 Moran (2001) uses a number of different case studies to show that deliberate technology transfers of this kind are common with foreign firms often
offering, for example, technical assistance, management experience or quality assurance systems to their suppliers.
Domestic Firm 
Foreign Firm 
Foreign Firm 
Supplies inputs 
Supplies inputs 
Forward 
linkage/technology 
transfer 
Backward 
linkage/technology 
transfer 
Fig. 1. Definition of FDI spillovers. Note: Direction of linkages is defined from the perspective of foreign firms.
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As such, direct spillovers through linkages and indirect spillovers in the form of externalities are both likely.
It is also possible that FDI into downstream sectors may lead to negative spillovers. For example, where there are direct
linkages between foreign firms and domestic input suppliers it is possible that foreign firms have more bargaining power
during contract negotiations. This results in lower profits for domestic firms, which will appear as a loss in measured
productivity (Girma et al., 2008). Rodriguez-Clare (1996) proposes that a pre-condition for positive spillovers through
backward linkages is that domestic input suppliers produce varieties that are similar to the input requirements of the
foreign firm. Accordingly, domestic firms may experience negative productivity impacts if they attempt to provide inputs
they are not suited to producing.
Negative backward spillovers for domestic firms not directly linked with downstream foreign firms may also result
through a competition channel. If, for example, foreign firms import intermediates, and competition from imports results in
a loss in customers for domestic input suppliers, it will reduce profits for domestic upstream firms. This will negatively
impact on measured productivity.5
Forward spillovers occur when FDI into upstream sectors impacts on the productivity of downstream domestic firms.
They can also be due to direct linkages or externalities and may be positive or negative. Spillovers through direct linkages
are possible if intermediates provided by foreign-invested firms embody new, more advanced technologies from which
domestic firms can learn (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Learning of this kind may as well spillover to domestic firms, not
directly linked with foreign firms, if they or other domestic firms copy these inputs. In this way positive spillovers in the
form of externalities are possible through this channel although they are arguably less likely. It is possible as well that inputs
supplied by foreign firms may be accompanied by services or other forms of support that impact on the productivity of
domestic users (Javorcik, 2004). This type of FDI spillover will only occur through direct linkages between foreign input
suppliers and domestic producers.
Indirect spillovers are also possible if an increase in foreign investment in upstream sectors increases competitive
pressures forcing all input suppliers in those sectors to eliminate inefficiencies (or slack) in the production process or use
their inputs more efficiently to survive. As a result, downstream domestic firms that use any inputs from these sectors may
experience productivity improvements due to more efficiently-produced inputs by all upstream firms. Conversely, the entry
of foreign firms into upstream sectors may be anti-competitive if the foreign firm ends up holding a significant amount
market share. If upstream domestic firms can no longer compete, downstream firms may have to pay higher prices for their
inputs (or even suffer lower quality inputs).
Much of the recent empirical research investigating the existence of such FDI externalities in developing country
contexts focuses on vertical linkages, particularly backward linkages. Some of the most notable contributions include
Javorcik (2004). She finds evidence for productivity spillovers through backward linkages between domestic suppliers and
partially foreign-invested customers in Lithuania during its transition period when there was a large influx of foreign
investment. She finds no evidence for intra-sector spillovers or spillovers from foreign-invested input suppliers and
domestic firms. Blalock and Gertler (2008) also find evidence of productivity gains among firms that supply inputs to
foreign-invested firms in Indonesia. Kugler (2006) finds similar evidence for FDI spillovers that can be attributed to the
outsourcing of inputs by foreign firms to domestic suppliers in Columbia. Of relevance here is that there is a particularly
notable dearth of evidence in the literature on the existence of FDI spillovers through forward linkages from foreign-
invested firms to domestic suppliers.
Javorcik (2004) shows that the characteristics of foreign firms may be a determining factor in the extent to which
externalities from foreign firms exist. She finds that spillovers are only evident through backward linkages from partially5 Aitken and Harrison (1999) propose a similar competition channel as an explanation for negative horizontal spillovers whereby foreign firms
compete directly with domestic firms.
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likely to be better linked with the local economy through local sourcing of inputs compared to fully foreign-invested firms.
Giroud et al. (2012) and Marin and Bell (2006) find that the technological activities of the foreign firms themselves may be
an important determinant of whether spillovers are realised. They suggest that for policy aimed at attracting FDI to be
effective in generating technology externalities, the knowledge-creation activities and technological capabilities of the
foreign-invested firms as well as the extent to which they are linked with the local economy are both important
considerations. Moreover, Giroud et al. (2012) generally critique the focus in the literature on externalities from FDI
highlighting that it fails to identify important effects of linkages between foreign and domestic firms through, for example,
direct technology transfers.
We explore these issues in the context of Vietnam, an economy whose rapid growth rate over the last decade was fuelled
in part by a burgeoning local manufacturing sector and increasing levels of foreign direct investment and trade. Vietnam
represents an illustrative case of economies in transition. The liberalization of the Vietnamese economy began in 1986 with
the adoption of a range of policy measures under Doi Moi (“Renovation”), related in particular to the promotion of FDI and
trade liberalization. FDI promotion was a gradual process that took place through successive revisions to investment laws
between the late 1980s and the mid-2000s Trade liberalization took the form of the removal of export taxes and non-tariff
barriers and the negotiation of various trade agreements with ASEAN, the US and the EU, ultimately leading to WTO
accession in 2007.
Foreign-invested firms contribute in significant ways to the Vietnamese economy, particularly in the manufacturing
sector. Table 1 illustrates the contribution to output and employment of foreign-invested firms by sector between 2009 and
2012. In 2012 foreign-invested firms accounted for 55 per cent of output (revenues) and 50 per cent of employment. The
variability in importance of foreign investment across sectors is also of note. Foreign-invested firms account for respectively
89 and 99 per cent of revenue and 88 and 97 per cent of employment in ISIC 2-digit sectors 15 (leather and related products)
and 26 (computer, electronic and optical products). In other, more traditional, sectors such as sector 10 (food) and sector 16
(wood and wood products) they account for much less.3. Empirical approach
3.1. Production function estimation
The first step in our analysis requires that we estimate productivity for each firm in our sample. The standard approach is to
estimate a production function and use the estimated parameters to back out a firm-specific measure of productivity. OLS estimation
of the production function requires that inputs are determined independently of the firm's efficiency level. This is an unrealistic
assumption in most settings. It is very likely that firms' input choices are correlated with unobserved productivity shocks.
If a firm makes its variable input choices on the basis of productivity shocks that the firm, but not the econometrician
observes, this leads to a bias in OLS estimates of the coefficients on these inputs in the production function. For example,
firms with higher productivity may decide to employ more labour which would lead to an upward bias in the coefficient on
labour if productivity is not controlled for. Labour decisions could also be countercyclical with higher productivity firms
employing fewer labour inputs per unit of capital leading to a downward bias in OLS estimates of the coefficient on labour.
This is consistent with the idea that more productive firms become more capital intensive. The coefficient on capital will
also be biased where there is simultaneity. In both cases the bias could run in either direction.
Semi-parametric approaches which apply some structure to the underlying decision-making process of firms have
become a standard way to address these concerns. The most commonly applied approaches include Olley and Pakes (1996)
(OP), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg et al. (2006) (ACF).6 Using a set of assumptions about the behaviour of
firms in relation to how productivity evolves over time and the timing of input choices, these approaches correct for the
endogeneity between variable inputs and unobserved productivity. Here we use ACF's modification of the OP approach. It
addresses issues around the identification of the parameters in the first stage of the OP model. Moreover, we estimate the
model using the Wooldridge (2009) one-step GMM estimator which is more efficient than the standard two-step procedure.
We assume a Cobb–Douglas production function written in the following form for the purpose of empirical estimation:
yit ¼ βllitþβkkitþωitþeit ð1Þ
where yit is the log of value added, lit is the log of the labour input, kit is the log of the capital input, ωit is unobserved
productivity, and eit is an unanticipated shock or random error term. As in OP we assume that productivity evolves according
to a first-order Markov process so
E ωit jωit1;ωit2;…;ωi1ð Þ ¼ E ωit jIit1ð Þ ¼ E ωit jωit1ð Þ; t ¼ 2;3;…; T ð2Þ6 See Van Beveren (2010) for a full review of methods for estimating total factor productivity using firm-level data.
Table 1
Regional and sector-level contribution of foreign investors to output and employment.
Source: Authors' own calculations based on Vietnam Enterprise Survey 2009–2012.
2009 2010 2011 2012
% Output
All manufacturing 47.6 48.8 50.5 55.0
10: Food products 31.10 29.18 32.73 32.14
11: Beverages 59.17 48.91 50.52 50.94
12: Tobacco products 14.18 14.47 13.13 11.69
13: Textiles 58.72 57.8 62.6 64.3
14: Wearing apparel 55.6 55.6 53.8 56.2
15: Leather and related products 83.1 83.7 87.4 88.9
16: Wood and products of wood/cork 19.6 19.4 19.5 18.4
17: Paper and paper products 35.0 31.7 31.9 37.6
18: Printing and reproduction of recorded media 11.7 11.0 7.2 11.8
19: Coke and refined petroleum products 63.5 45.9 20.2 33.9
20: Chemicals and chemical products 52.3 52.3 52.5 52.3
21: Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals, etc 20.3 20.8 21.8 21.3
22: Rubber and plastics products 46.5 45.7 45.0 48.6
23: Other non-metallic mineral products 30.7 28.1 26.0 25.9
24: Basic metals 25.1 29.2 31.5 31.6
25: Fabricated metal products 43.6 44.4 43.4 48.8
26: Computer, electronic and optical products 95.3 96.8 98.3 99.3
27: Electrical equipment 62.3 62.2 62.1 65.8
28: Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 46.5 55.4 57.2 68.3
29: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 69.3 75.3 73.4 75.7
30: Other transport equipment 79.1 85.7 88.3 83.8
31: Furniture 49.3 48.6 46.3 51.7
32: Other manufacturing 57.3 86.6 86.8 88.2
% Employment
All manufacturing 47.2 49.2 46.4 49.9
10: Food products 18.8 19.8 20.3 19.6
11: Beverages 25.5 25.8 27.8 28.7
12: Tobacco products 4.8 4.7 4.1 0.8
13: Textiles 39.5 41.0 43.7 46.4
14: Wearing apparel 58.3 57.5 56.3 57.9
15: Leather and related products 76.7 79.7 85.4 88.5
16: Wood and products of wood/cork 13.6 13.1 14.6 16.5
17: Paper and paper products 25.8 24.6 26.6 27.2
18: Printing and reproduction of recorded media 15.6 13.1 11.0 13.8
19: Coke and refined petroleum products 18.9 17.6 13.5 20.7
20: Chemicals and chemical products 28.0 30.5 30.4 32.5
21: Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals, etc 17.0 19.5 18.1 19.7
22: Rubber and plastics products 49.4 50.2 49.3 50.2
23: Other non-metallic mineral products 11.3 11.1 11.7 12.0
24: Basic metals 16.1 16.8 20.1 23.1
25: Fabricated metal products 35.5 38.7 37.9 43.8
26: Computer, electronic and optical products 93.3 95.3 94.9 97.2
27: Electrical equipment 73.4 65.1 70.1 73.3
28: Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 38.5 43.6 43.4 49.0
29: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 50.7 58.0 78.1 80.7
30: Other transport equipment 52.2 60.2 68.2 70.8
31: Furniture 46.0 45.8 46.1 49.1
32: Other manufacturing 81.3 82.6 82.1 84.5
Note: For a full description of sectors see Table A1 of the Appendix.
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information set. In other words, the firm expectations about future productivity depend only on the productivity in the
previous period.
We assume that investment, and hence the capital stock kit, is chosen at time t1. This is consistent with the OP
assumption about capital accumulation where capital is formed according to the following process:
kit ¼ 1δð Þkit1þ iit1 ð3Þ
where iit1 is the lag of investment.
Also in accordance with OP, we assume that labour is chosen at the same time that productivity is realised.
An implication of these assumptions regarding the timing of input choices and the evolution of productivity is that:
ωit ¼ f kit ; iitð Þ ð4Þ
C. Newman et al. / European Economic Review 76 (2015) 168–187 173Assuming that E eit jkit ; iitð Þ ¼ 0, and substituting for ωit, in Eq. (1) can be written as
yit ¼ βllitþβkkitþ f kit ; iitð Þþeit ; t ¼ 1;2;…; T ð5Þ
The parameters βl and βk will not be separately identified, the former due to collinearity between labour and productivity
(Ackerberg et al., 2006) and the latter due to the inclusion of kit in f(.).
Returning to the process assumed to underlie the evolution of productivity described in Eq. (2) we define innovation as
follows:
ξit ¼ ωitE ωit jωit1ð Þ ð6Þ
Combined with Eq. (4) which implies that ωit1 ¼ g ki1; iit1ð Þ and after some rearranging, Eq. (6) can be rewritten as
ωit ¼ f g ki1; iit1ð Þ
 þξit ð7Þ
Substituting into Eq. (1) provides us with a second equation which can be used to identify the two parameters of interest,
βl and βk:
yit ¼ βllitþβkkitþ f g kit1; iit1ð Þ
 þvit ; t ¼ 2;3;…; T ð8Þ
where vit ¼ ξitþeit . A set of suitable moment restrictions emerges from the assumptions underlying the evolution of
productivity and the timing of the choice of inputs. Eq. (6) implies that innovation will be independent of the information
set at time t1, i.e. ωit1. Since kit is determined at period t1 it will be uncorrelated with unobserved innovation ξit. In
other words:
E ξit jkitð Þ ¼ 0 ð9Þ
Innovation will, however, be correlated with any production decisions that are made between period t1 and t. As such,
the labour input, determined at period t, will be correlated with ξit. The lag of labour, lit1, however, will not, given that it is
part of the information set at time t1. As such:
E ξit jlit1ð Þ ¼ 0 ð10Þ
The full set of moment conditions for (8) is therefore given by E vit jkit ; lit1; kit1; iit1ð Þ ¼ 0. The unknown functions f(.)
and g(.) are approximated by third-degree polynomials. Eq. (8) can be estimated using pooled instrumental variables
estimation with the instrument set zit ¼ kit ; lit1; kit1; iit1;…ð Þ, where all higher order terms and their interactions in the
polynomials act as their own instruments and all lags can also be used as instruments in testing overidentifying
restrictions.7 In the estimation of Eq. (8) a full set of time dummies is included to control for heterogeneity over time in
the production function and productivity. Once we have consistent estimators for βl and βk, productivity can be estimated
using Eq. (11).
ω^it ¼ yit β^llit β^kkit ð11Þ3.2. Second stage model for FDI spillovers
Our core focus is on identifying whether there is evidence for FDI spillovers on the productivity of domestic firms and
determining whether spillovers are associated with direct linkages. We begin by first establishing the extent to which we can
detect positive productivity spillovers associated with FDI presence within and across sectors using standard measures applied in
the literature. We follow Javorcik (2004) and consider three measures: (i) the proportion of total revenue within each 4-digit sector
accounted for by foreign-owned firms to capture horizontal spillovers (Eq. (12)); (ii) the proportion of total revenue in upstream
sectors accounted for by foreign-owned firms to capture forward spillovers (Eq. (13)); and (iii) the proportion of total revenue in
downstream sectors accounted for by foreign-owned firms to capture backward spillovers (Eq. (14)).
Hjt ¼
Xk
i ¼ 1
Rijt
Xn
i ¼ 1
Rijt
,
ð12Þ
where k is the subset of firms that are foreign-owned and R is revenue. Firms are denoted by the subscript i, sectors by j and time
by t.
Fjt ¼
XJ1
u ¼ 1
αutHut ð13Þ7 Alternatively, Eqs. (5) and (8) can be estimated simultaneously using system GMM with instrument sets given by zit1 ¼ lit ; kit ; iit ;…ð Þ and
zit2 ¼ kit ; lit1; kit1 ; iit1;…ð Þ, respectively.
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firms in upstream sector u.
Bjt ¼
XJ1
d ¼ 1
αdtHdt ð14Þ
where αdt is the proportion of output from sector j sold to sector d in time t and Hdt is the proportion of foreign-owned firms in
downstream sector d.
We are interested in identifying how the change in FDI is related to the change in firm-level productivity. The challenge
in identifying this effect is that there are many potential confounding factors that impact on the change in the amount of FDI
into a sector and the change in the productivity of the firm. For example, FDI may be attracted to a sector that has benefited
from a recent infrastructural investment. Improved infrastructure is also likely to impact on the productivity of the firm
potentially confounding the effect of FDI. Including sector fixed effects goes some way towards resolving this problem,
controlling for all time-invariant sector-specific factors that could influence the change in the level of FDI into a sector and
the productivity path of firms in that sector. We also control for observable time-varying sector specific factors including the
level of concentration of the sector, imports into the sector, and exports from the sector. We include year-dummies, which
will control more generally for aggregate changes in the economic environment that could lead to both increases in FDI and
improvements in firm-level productivity, and province-dummies, which control for spatial differences in the pattern of FDI
and economic activity and performance.
Our baseline specification is given by8:
Δωijpt ¼ αþη1ΔHjtþη2ΔFjtþη3ΔBjtþδΔZjtþsjþτtþπpþeijpt ð15Þ
where Δωijpt is the change in productivity of firm i in sector j in province p in time t; ΔHjt, ΔFjt, and ΔBjt are the change in the
horizontal, forward and backward indirect spillover measures defined above; Zjt is a matrix of time-varying sector specific
control variables; sj are sector fixed effects; τt are time fixed effects; πp are province fixed effects; and eijpt is a statistical
noise term.
We add to the empirical literature which has analysed FDI spillovers by also including direct measures of linkages between
domestic and FDI firms. Our data provide us with information on whether domestic firms are supplied by FDI firms or have FDI
firms as customers. Moreover, we have data on whether firms receive technology transfers from their suppliers and/or customers.
The availability of these data allows us to extend the analysis of FDI spillovers in two ways. First, we can examine the direct
productivity impact of linkages and technology transfers. This is achieved through the estimation of Eqs. (16a) and (16b):
Δωijpt ¼ αþγ1FDIsupijptþγ2FDIcustijptþsjþτtþπpþeijpt ð16aÞ
Δωijpt ¼ αþϕ1FDIsup_techijptþϕ2FDIsup_notechijpt
þϕ3FDIcust_techijptþϕ2FDIcust_notechijptþsjþτtþπpþeijpt ð16bÞ
where FDIsup is an indicator for whether the firm is supplied by an FDI firm and FDIcust is and indicator for whether the firm has
an FDI firm as a customer. The addition of ‘tech’ and ‘notech’ to the variables in Eq. (16b) signifies the disaggregation of these
variables into cases where the firm received technology transfers from suppliers/customers and those that did not, respectively.
Second, we can examine the extent to which the spillover measures used in model (15) are related to direct linkages
between foreign and domestic firms and technology transfers as is typically assumed to be the case in empirical studies of
this kind. To test this we examine the impact of the interaction between being directly linked with foreign firms along the
supply chain and the existence of FDI spillovers. We also disaggregate linkages by whether they are associated with
technology transfers or not. This allows us to isolate the component of the traditional spillover measure that is due to direct
linkages and direct technology transfers. The models we estimate are given in Eqs. (17a) and (17b).
Δωijpt ¼ αþη1ΔHjtþη2ΔFjtþη3ΔBjtþγ1FDIsupijptþγ2FDIcustijpt
þλ1ΔFjt  FDIsupijptþλ2ΔBjt  FDIcustijpt
þsjþτtþπpþeijpt ð17aÞ
Δωijpt ¼ αþη1ΔHjtþη2ΔFjtþη3ΔBjt
þϕ1FDIsup_techijptþϕ2FDIsup_notechijpt
þϕ3FDIcust_techijptþϕ2FDIcust_notechijpt
þδ1ΔFjt  FDIsup_techijptþδ2ΔFjt  FDIsup_notechijpt
þδ3ΔBjt  FDIcust_techijptþδ4ΔBjt  FDIcust_notechijpt
þsjþτtþπpþeijpt ð17bÞ8 Our productivity measure is based on a real value-added, rather than a unit output, production function. Unfortunately, we cannot directly measure
average unit-value of output in our data. As a robustness-check on our results we disentangle the effects of market power through mark-ups and
productivity gains by focusing on competitive sectors where individual firms lack market power so value-added closely tracks output quantities. Doing so
confirms our results.
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Our data are from four rounds of the Vietnam Technology and Competitiveness Survey (TCS) which gathered detailed
information on supply chain linkages, technology transfers, and other topics for a nationally representative sample of over
4000 Vietnamese manufacturing enterprises in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 (CIEM, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014). Our sample is a
sub-set of manufacturing firms covered by the Vietnam Enterprise Survey (VES) (which includes over 52,000 manufacturing
enterprises) administered annually by the General Statistics Office.
The TCS survey is administered at the same time and under the same circumstances as the VES. The VES gathers balance
sheet and other information on the activities of firms. The survey instruments are mailed out to firms which submit the
completed questionnaires by return post to the Provincial Statistics Office. Under the Law on Statistics all firms are legally
required to comply. Any firms that do not respond are contacted by provincial authorities by mail, by phone or through face-
to-face visits. All data gathered is checked by the General Statistics Office for internal consistency and cross-checked with
the administrative provincial data before being made available.
The TCS was included as an additional module for the sampled firms in the years under study. We match these data with
information on firm activities and financial accounts gathered using the main VES instrument. This produces a rich database
that allows us to explore in detail the link between productivity, technology transfers, and the underlying mechanisms at
work. While we focus in the main analysis on the 2009–2012 period where we have TCS data, we match data from the TCS
to the VES data from 2006–2012. In this way, we can include lags (required for the estimation of the production function)
without compromising on the number of years of data we can use from the TCS sample. The caveat is that we can only
include firms established since 2006. Any entrants since then will not be included. To ensure that productivity estimates are
representative we use the entire VES sample in the estimation of the production functions.
The sector classification system used here is based on VSIC 2007, which corresponds closely to ISIC Revision 4. Two
sectors, Sector 12, the manufacture of tobacco products, and sector 19, the manufacture of coke and refined petroleum
products, are excluded due to too few firms in Vietnam operating in these sectors. The full list of manufacturing sectors and
the number of firms covered by our data in each year are presented in Table A1 of Appendix A. Also shown is the number of
observations on private domestic firms in our sample and the number of observations for which productivity estimates can
be obtained.9
The output variable included in our production function is value added computed using data on profits from production
activities and wages deflated using an annual GDP deflator. Capital is measured as the deflated value of assets at the
beginning of the year while labour is the total number of workers employed at the end of the year. We measure assets at the
beginning and the number of employees at the end of the year given the timing of the input choices assumed in the model
outlined in Section 3. Investment is measured as the change in the value of fixed and long term assets over the year plus any
accumulated depreciation.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for each of these variables for the entire VES sample used in the estimation of the
production functions for the 2006–2012 period. On average the value added of firms in the VES sample declined between
2007 and 2011. This can be explained by the large increase in the number of firms in the sample due to a rapidly expanding
domestic manufacturing sector and the decline in profits during the years of the global economic crisis. Between 2011 and
2012 value added recovered. Contractions in capital stock, labour and investment are also evident during the crisis years,
while recovery followed in 2012.
Our key innovation is the inclusion of firm-level information on technology transfers to supplement the Javorcik (2004)
FDI spillover measures. This responds to the Zanfei (2012) and Giroud et al. (2012) critique of the standard approach which
identifies indirect spillovers from FDI rather than direct effects through intentional knowledge flows between foreign firms
and domestic suppliers or customers. Accordingly, in our TCS module, firms are asked whether they are supplied inputs by
(FDIsup) or supply inputs to (FDIcust) foreign-owned firms located in Vietnam. We use these indicator variables to measure
direct linkages between domestic firms and foreign firms along the supply chain.
In addition, firms are asked whether contracting relationships with suppliers and customers result in technology
transfers from the supplier to the enterprise. We disaggregate the indicators for direct linkages with FDI suppliers and
customers by whether or not they are associated with technology transfers. So for firms that are supplied inputs by FDI
firms, which also report that they receive a technology transfer from their intermediate input suppliers, we regard this
as a forward technology transfer from an FDI producer of intermediate inputs to the firm (FDIsup_tech); and we
distinguish these from firms that have FDI suppliers but do not receive technology transfers (FDIsup_notech). Similarly,
for firms which report they have contracting relationships with customers which lead to technology transfers and
simultaneously have FDI firms as customers we regard this as a backward technology transfer from an FDI customer to
the firm (FDIcust_tech); and we distinguish this from firms that have FDI customers but do not receive technology
transfers from them (FDIcust_notech).9 A caveat of using our semi-parametric approaches is that it requires that firms have positive levels of investment and so firms with zero investment
are excluded. This accounts for 10 per cent of the full VES sample.
Table 2
Summary statistics for production function variables.
VES sample 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
n¼9161 n¼10,633 n¼12,317 n¼15,810 n¼17,799 n¼18,688 n¼15,956
Production function Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Value added 3918 24,244 4024 21,332 3411 19,954 3406 26,350 3336 24,979 2431 24,408 4753 56,747
Capital 21,971 121,968 21,467 112,497 19,907 103,818 19,021 115,847 18,775 117,924 13,510 95,517 24,832 164,325
Labour 186 895 178 833 160 853 124 683 115 494 84 338 137 556
Investment 6125 41,033 6580 42,854 6059 47,590 4828 41,632 4959 47,857 3202 32,890 6102 53,688
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domestic firms (79 per cent of the TCS sample) we use in our analysis and also for foreign firms (19 per cent of the TCS
sample) for comparison purposes. Approximately 16 per cent of private domestic firms reported that they were supplied
inputs by a foreign-owned firm at some point during the sample period. This can be compared with almost 77 per cent of
foreign-owned firms in our sample. Around half of the inputs supplied by FDI firms to downstream private domestic firms is
associated with technology transfers. The extent of linkages between private domestic firms and downstream FDI firms is
reflected in over 26 per cent of private domestic firms selling their output to FDI firms. A smaller proportion, around one-
third, is associated with technology transfers. Some 70 per cent of foreign-owned firms report that they sell their output to
downstream FDI firms with only around 21 per cent of these being associated with technology transfers.
Summary statistics for the sector specific spillover measures are also presented in Table 3. These measures are computed
as defined in Eq. (12) for horizontal spillovers, Eq. (13) for vertical spillovers through forward linkages, and Eq. (14) for
vertical spillovers through backward linkages. They can be interpreted as the proportion of revenue, on average, generated
by foreign-invested firms in the same sector in the case of (12), in upstream sectors in the case of (13) and in downstream
sectors in the case of (14). Linkages for the vertical spillover measures are constructed using the Vietnam Supply-Use
Tables (SUT) for 2007. The SUT maps the use of 138 commodities in 112 production activities.10 We link these production
activities to the 4-digit ISIC codes used in the VES to produce 42 comparable sector codes. The SUT data are used to construct
the weights in Eqs. (13) and (14) that capture linkages between sectors.
To illustrate, for linkages with upstream sectors (i.e. αut in Eq. (13)), for each (SUT) sector j, their link with upstream (SUT)
sector u is the proportional contribution of output from sector u to its total input base. Similarly for linkages with
downstream sectors (i.e. αdt in Eq. (14)), for each (SUT) sector j, their link with downstream (SUT) sector d is the proportional
contribution of output from sector j to the input base of sector d. These weights are used to compute a weighted average of
foreign dominance in upstream and downstream sectors, respectively.11 Also presented in Table 3 are the foreign dominance
measures for wholly foreign-owned firms and joint ventures.12
As an example of the kind of linkages we identify consider the 2-digit ISIC sector 10, namely food products. The SUT
weights (not shown) suggest that one of the main suppliers of the food products and beverages sector is the chemicals and
chemical products sector (sector 20). Inputs from chemicals and chemical products are likely to be in the form of additives
or preservatives. Now, take a case where there is a dominance of foreign firms supplying chemicals and chemical products to
domestic producers of food and beverages. This could result in productivity spillovers due to forward linkages if foreign
firms offer new varieties of preservatives or additives, not available from domestic producers, leading to more efficient
production by domestic downstream food producers.
If the above spillover is due to a direct linkages or technology transfers it will be picked up in our firm specific measures.
If not, it will appear as an indirect spillover effect. On the other hand if there is a dominance of foreign-owned firms in the
food products sector supplied by domestic producers of chemicals and chemical products we might expect to see
productivity spillovers through backward linkages if the foreign-owned food producers provide domestic producers of
chemicals with new technologies to improve their production techniques or quality standards. As for forward linkages, if the
spillover is due to direct linkages or technology transfers it will be picked up in our firm-specific measures. If not, it will
appear as a positive externality through the backward indirect spillover measure.
Each of the sector-level measures is computed using the full census of manufacturing firms included in the VES. We also
include a control for sector-level concentration measured at the 4-digit sector level using the standard Herfindahl–10 See Arndt et al. (2010) for a full description of the 2007 social accounting matrix for Vietnam and details of its construction.
11 Recent work by Barrios et al. (2011) highlights the potential measurement problems in using weights of this kind to measure linkages between
downstream foreign affiliates and upstream domestic firms given that the former are likely to have a different pattern of input sourcing. They propose that
using home country input-output tables to construct these weights is a more accurate approach. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the country of
origin of the foreign affiliates and so cannot use this approach. It will not, however, affect our measure of linkages between downstream domestic firms and
upstream foreign affiliates.
12 It should be noted that while these measures do not appear to vary much on average over time, within sectors there is a significant amount of
variation across the years.
Table 3
Summary statistics for second stage empirical analysis.
TCS sample n¼4278 n¼4258 n¼4112 n¼3158
Ownership types
Private 77.82 78.77 78.84 79.86
Foreign 19.50 19.28 18.99 18.18
State 2.69 1.95 2.16 1.96
Private Foreign Private Foreign Private Foreign Private Foreign
Linkages
FDI supplier 17.48 74.46 16.96 78.56 15.39 77.46 15.50 78.57
With technology transfer 8.17 27.70 8.47 30.57 8.20 31.63 7.89 32.93
No technology transfer 9.31 46.76 8.50 47.99 7.19 45.84 7.61 45.64
FDI customer 26.19 67.99 27.19 71.38 25.85 71.06 27.12 70.38
With technology transfer 8.71 14.39 9.51 16.20 9.25 15.24 9.99 16.55
No technology transfer 17.48 53.60 17.68 55.18 16.59 55.83 17.12 53.83
FDI Spilloversa Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Horizontal 0.40 0.20 0.41 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.42 0.21
Forwards 0.38 0.17 0.40 0.17 0.37 0.19 0.41 0.19
Forwards JV 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.05
Forwards 100% 0.27 0.17 0.30 0.18 0.30 0.19 0.33 0.19
Backwards 0.41 0.13 0.41 0.14 0.43 0.13 0.43 0.14
Backwards JV 0.15 0.08 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.07
Backwards 100% 0.26 0.14 0.27 0.14 0.30 0.12 0.33 0.13
Sector characteristicsa
Sector concentration 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06
Log exports 11.44 2.83 11.72 2.55 11.72 2.62 11.83 2.57
Log imports 11.01 2.66 11.26 2.37 11.10 2.51 11.06 2.48
a Computed using full VES sample in each year.
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HHIjt ¼
Xn
i ¼ 1 rs
2
ijt ð18Þ
where rsijt is the revenue share of firm i in sector j at time t. As shown in Table 3 this measure averages around 0.05
suggesting a high degree of competition within the sectors included in our analysis.
Controls for the level of imports and exports from each 4-digit sector are also included. Data for these variables are taken
from the UN COMTRADE database available through World Integrated Trade Solutions on the value of exports and imports
for 4-digit ISIC sectors for Vietnam with the rest of the world.
5. Results
5.1. Productivity estimation
The first step of our empirical approach is to estimate firm-level productivity. Using the approach outlined in Section 2
we estimate production functions separately for sub-sectors of manufacturing.13 We use the full sample of firms from the
VES in estimating productivity as the larger sample is more representative and will provide more accurate estimates of the
production function parameters. The coefficient estimates are presented in Table 4.
In all cases tests for weak identification, underidentification and the first stage F-tests confirm the validity of the
instruments.14 We use higher order terms of the instruments or additional lags to test for overidentification. For some
sectors we find the lag of labour to be an unsuitable instrument for current period labour. In these cases we use a higher
order term of the lag of labour or the second lag as the instrument. The final specification is an exactly identified system to
avoid loss of data due to the inclusion of additional lags but the results do not change much when we use different
combinations of valid overidentifying restrictions. Details of the instrument used in each sector and the instrument used to
test for the overidentifying restrictions are provided in Table 4.
We also present in Table 4 the estimates from OLS estimation and using the standard OP approach. In all cases the
coefficient on capital is lower when the production function is estimated using our preferred approach as compared with13 Sectors are divided into 2-digit sub-sectors for the purpose of estimating productivity. Some are grouped together due to the fact that there are too
few firms in some sectors. The groupings are indicated in Table A1 of Appendix A.
14 In the table we present p-values for each test. The underidentification test is based on the Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistic, the weak identification
test is based on the Cragg–Donald Wald F statistic, the F-test is based on Angrist–Pischke multivariate F-test of excluded instruments in the first stage, and
the test for the overidentifying restrictions is based on Hansen's J test.
Table 4
Production function estimates.
Wooldridge OP OLS Wooldridge OP OLS
VSIC 10-11 VSIC 16
l 0.699nnn 0.727nnn 0.752nnn l 0.890nnn 0.852nnn 0.870nnn
(0.019) (0.008) (0.012) (0.022) (0.010) (0.016)
k 0.275nnn 0.310nnn 0.414nnn k 0.251nnn 0.293nnn 0.338nnn
(0.022) (0.060) (0.007) (0.026) (0.026) (0.009)
Instrument for l lag_l2 lag_l
Observations 10,622 8404 10,622 Observations 4778 3661 ,778
RTS 0.974 1.037 1.166 RTS 1.141 1.145 1.208
Under ident. 0.000 Under ident. 0.000
Weak ident. 0.000 Weak ident. 0.000
F-test of exl. inst. 0.000 F-test of exl. inst. 0.000
Hansen J statistic 0.740 Hansen J statistic 0.201
Extra instrument lag2_l Extra instrument lag2_l
VSIC 13 VSIC 17
l 0.834nnn 0.779nnn 0.815nnn l 1.055nnn 0.911nnn 0.978nnn
(0.025) (0.014) (0.022) (0.036) (0.017) (0.027)
k 0.196nnn 0.350nnn 0.357nnn k 0.096nnn 0.128n 0.280nnn
(0.034) (0.067) (0.012) (0.037) (0.076) (0.014)
Instrument for l lag_l lag_l
Observations 2799 1975 2799 Observations 2939 2197 2939
RTS 1.030 1.129 1.172 RTS 1.151 1.039 1.258
Under ident. 0.000 Under ident. 0.000
Weak ident. 0.000 Weak ident. 0.000
F-test of exl. inst. 0.000 F-test of exl. inst. 0.000
Hansen J statistic 0.678 Hansen J statistic 0.250
Extra instrument lag_l2 Extra instrument lag2_l
VSIC 14 VSIC 18
l 1.012nnn 0.921nnn 0.892nnn l 0.867nnn 0.863nnn 0.767nnn
(0.017) (0.009) (0.014) (0.029) (0.014) (0.021)
k 0.067nn 0.174nnn 0.306nnn k 0.204nnn 0.230nnn 0.427nnn
(0.028) (0.054) (0.011) (0.025) (0.027) (0.012)
Instrument for l lag_l lag_l
Observations 4062 2794 4062 Observations 2469 1650 2469
RTS 1.079 1.095 1.288 RTS 1.071 1.093 1.194
Under ident. 0.000 Under ident. 0.000
Weak ident. 0.000 Weak ident. 0.000
F-test of exl. inst. 0.000 F-test of exl. inst. 0.000
Hansen J statistic 0.130 Hansen J statistic 0.418
Extra instrument lag_l2 Extra instrument lag_l2
VSIC 15 VSIC 20-21
l 0.903nnn 0.890nnn 0.830nnn l 0.612nnn 0.709nnn 0.736nnn
(0.031) (0.018) (0.025) (0.043) (0.020) (0.033)
k 0.173nn 0.076 0.332nnn k 0.382nnn 0.518nnn 0.466nnn
(0.077) (0.083) (0.017) (0.049) (0.036) (0.016)
Instrument for l lag_l lag_l2
Observations 1139 835 1139 Observations 2812 2032 2812
RTS 1.076 0.966 1.162 RTS 0.994 1.227 1.202
Under ident. 0.000 Under ident. 0.000
Weak ident. 0.000 Weak ident. 0.000
F-test of exl. inst. 0.000 F-test of exl. inst. 0.000
Hansen J statistic 0.119 Hansen J statistic 0.137
Extra instrument lag_l2 Extra instrument lag_l3
VSIC 22 VSIC 26-28
l 0.849nnn 0.788nnn 0.791nnn l 0.736nnn 0.769nnn 0.788nnn
(0.027) (0.013) (0.021) (0.038) (0.015) (0.030)
k 0.264nnn 0.329nnn 0.384nnn k 0.228nnn 0.382nnn 0.365nnn
(0.029) (0.055) (0.011) (0.043) (0.066) (0.026)
lag_l lag2_l
Observations 4429 3169 4429 Observations 2481 2471 2481
RTS 1.112 1.117 1.175 RTS 0.964 1.151 1.153
Under ident. 0.000 Under ident. 0.000
Weak ident. 0.000 Weak ident. 0.000
F-test of exl. inst. 0.000 F-test of exl. inst. 0.000
Hansen J statistic 0.394 Hansen J statistic 0.240
Extra instrument lag_l2 Extra instrument lag2_k
VSIC 23 VSIC 29, 30, 32
l 0.877nnn 0.833nnn 0.839nnn l 0.733nnn 0.823nnn 0.879nnn
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Table 4 (continued )
Wooldridge OP OLS Wooldridge OP OLS
(0.025) (0.012) (0.019) (0.044) (0.016) (0.031)
k 0.198nnn 0.286nnn 0.359nnn k 0.238nnn 0.346nnn 0.294nnn
(0.033) (0.014) (0.011) (0.046) (0.054) (0.026)
lag_l lag2_l
Observations 5408 4349 5408 Observations 2027 2053 2027
RTS 1.075 1.119 1.198 RTS 0.971 1.169 1.173
Under ident. 0.000 Under ident. 0.000
Weak ident. 0.000 Weak ident. 0.000
F-test of exl. inst. 0.000 F-test of exl. inst. 0.000
Hansen J statistic 0.327 Hansen J statistic 0.928
Extra instrument lag2_k Extra instrument lag2_k
VSIC 24-25 VSIC 31
l 0.807nnn 0.839nnn 0.888nnn l 0.997nnn 0.930nnn 0.835nnn
(0.028) (0.009) (0.019) (0.023) (0.011) (0.017)
k 0.232nnn 0.179nnn 0.295nnn k 0.134nnn 0.167nnn 0.339nnn
(0.023) (0.043) (0.016) (0.029) (0.036) (0.011)
lag2_l lag_l
Observations 6440 6895 6440 Observations 4083 3077 4083
RTS 1.039 1.018 1.183 RTS 1.131 1.097 1.174
Under ident. 0.000 Under ident. 0.000
Weak ident. 0.000 Weak ident. 0.000
F-test of exl. inst. 0.000 F-test of exl. inst. 0.000
Hansen J statistic 0.120 Hansen J statistic 0.968
Extra instrument lag2_k Extra instrument lag_l2
Note: Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. P-values for underidentification test is based on the Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistic,
weak identification test is based on the Cragg–Donald Wald F statistic, F-test is based on Angrist–Pischke multivariate F-test of excluded instruments
in the first stage, and the test for the overidentifying restrictions is based on Hansen's J test. Sectors 21–22, 30–33 and 34–35 are combined in
estimating productivity due to small number of observations in some sectors. The implication of this is that they are assumed to have common production
functions.
nnn po0.01.
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would lead to an upward bias in the capital coefficient. The coefficient on labour is also lower for some sectors, suggesting
that in these sectors there is a positive correlation between labour and productivity leading to an upward bias in the labour
coefficient when using OLS. It is, however, higher in others, suggesting that in these sectors there is a negative correlation
between labour and productivity. This is consistent with the idea that more productive firms employ fewer units of labour
per unit of output.
The OP parameters in general appear to under-correct for the extent of the bias in the labour and capital coefficients. In
some cases (5 out of 14) OP estimates the bias on the labour coefficient to be in the opposite direction to what we find using
our approach. This is consistent with the idea that the identification of the labour coefficient in the first stage is hampered
by multicollinearity as explained by Ackerberg et al. (2006). Overall, returns to scale is lowest when using our approach
suggesting that OLS and OP lead to an underestimation of productivity. We base the second stage of our analysis on the
productivity estimates obtained using our approach to estimating the production function parameters. We present the
results using the OP approach later as a robustness check.
Average productivity (estimated using our approach) for each sector and the growth trajectory for the 2008–2012 period
are presented in Table 5. Average productivity levels across sectors cannot be compared given that the production functions
are estimated separately for each sector thus implicitly assuming that firms within sectors share a common technology but
that this technology is different between sectors. The productivity trajectory in each sector can be compared. It should be
noted that changes in productivity over time may be due to real productivity changes or the entry and exit of firms given
that we are working with an unbalanced panel of firms.
Some sectors experienced declines in productivity over the period. They include, most notably, sectors 10–11 (food
products and beverages), sector 16 (wood and wood products), sector 18 (printing and production of recorded media), sector
20–21 (chemicals and chemical products and pharmaceuticals, etc), 23 (other non-metallic mineral products), and sector
24–25 (basic and fabricated metals). Sectors experiencing the fastest productivity growth include sector 15 (leather and
related products), sector 22 (rubber and plastics) and sector 32 (furniture).5.2. FDI spillovers
The overall aim of our analysis is to determine the extent to which the productivity of firms is related to FDI, considering
both direct and indirect effects. To explore these effects we use the sub-sample of firms included in the TCS dataset for
Table 5
Estimated average productivity and productivity growth 2009–2012.
2-digit sector Average Productivity growth
Productivity 2009 2010 2011 2012
10–11 1.322 100.00 96.18 94.16 91.27
13 1.585 100.00 110.07 105.80 106.67
14 1.895 100.00 106.72 106.06 104.85
15 1.563 100.00 126.08 121.06 128.29
16 0.755 100.00 95.84 96.73 87.53
17 1.598 100.00 109.58 103.57 109.32
18 1.626 100.00 97.27 90.42 89.73
20–21 1.251 100.00 100.71 99.76 92.92
22 1.074 100.00 100.87 98.84 115.36
23 1.274 100.00 96.55 88.72 80.68
24–25 1.447 100.00 98.88 93.07 90.03
26-28 1.937 100.00 98.64 93.86 97.68
29, 30, 32 1.829 100.00 101.61 98.22 106.61
32 1.353 100.00 107.58 101.16 109.90
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for indirect spillovers given in Eq. (15) which is the typical specification used in empirical studies of this kind. Results are
presented in Table 6.15
We find no evidence to suggest that there are horizontal spillovers or externalities associated with operating in a sector
with a large presence of foreign-owned firms. This is consistent with findings of other empirical studies (Barrios et al., 2011;
Blalock and Gertler, 2008; Bwaly, 2006; Damijan et al., 2008; Javorcik, 2004; Kugler, 2006) and suggests that foreign firms
have an incentive to protect their technology and know-how and prevent it from leaking to competitors, as highlighted by
Javorcik (2004).
Focussing on vertical spillovers we find strong evidence for negative forward spillovers from a dominance of FDI in
upstream sectors on the productivity of domestic downstream firms that purchase inputs from these sectors. Negative
spillovers are associated with both joint venture and wholly foreign-owned firms (column 2). Javorcik (2004) also finds
some evidence of negative forward spillovers, but not to the same magnitude as here, or as well determined.
There is evidence of positive backward spillovers from downstream sectors with a dominance of foreign-owned firms to
upstream domestic firms supplying inputs to those sectors. This is also consistent with findings in other empirical studies
(Javorcik, 2004; Blalock and Gertler, 2008; Kugler, 2006). Moreover, in column 2, we find that this positive spillover is
associated with a dominance of joint ventures between foreign-owned firms and Vietnamese firms (either state or
privately-owned). Javorcik (2004) finds that backward spillovers are only evident from partially-owned foreign firms in the
Lithuanian case.
Our results for the Vietnamese case are as noted consistent with the findings of other similar empirical studies. It is
difficult, however, on the basis of these findings, to say anything about the underlying mechanisms at work. As highlighted
in Section 2, in the case of positive backward spillovers from downstream foreign firms to domestic firms, we cannot say –
based on the analysis so far – whether (i) these spillovers are due to direct knowledge and/or technology transfers to
domestic firms linked with foreign firms along the supply chain, or (ii) they are due to indirect spillovers in the form of, for
example, efficiency improvements due to increased competition among domestic input suppliers competing for foreign
customers or scale economies due to a greater demand for domestically produced inputs.16
Negative spillovers from upstream foreign firms to domestic firms in downstream sectors could also be due to negative
effects associated with direct linkages between domestic firms and foreign input suppliers. This includes for example
domestic firms which are locked into using inputs purchased from FDI firms because of high sunk costs or asymmetric
bargaining power in the negotiation of input contracts if FDI firms have a dominant position upstream. They could also be
due to negative indirect externalities such as foreign-owned firms gaining market power in upstream sectors.
To disentangle the above effects we focus on the impact of direct linkages between FDI firms and domestic firms along
the supply chain on productivity and the extent to which firms report that they experience technology transfers through
these links. Using the firm level indicators described in Section 4, we estimate the model given in Eq. (16a). The results are
presented in column 1 of Table 7.
We include the firm specific indicators of linkages along with the same set of sector control variables, year, sector and
province fixed effects. We find a positive and well-determined relationship between being linked with an FDI firm upstream15 Here and throughout, we report clustered standard errors at the sector-year level.
16 We also explored possible additional mechanisms by estimating a range of models that interacts the backward indirect spillover measure with
various firm characteristics. We find some evidence that the positive spillover from downstream FDI firms is associated with firms that expand production
into other sectors or change sector altogether. This is consistent with Newman et al. (2013) who find that firms tend to switch into sectors where there are
opportunities for productivity gains. Results (not presented) are available on request.
Table 6
Impact of indirect FDI spillovers on productivity.
(1) (2)
Indirect spillovers
Horizontal 0.010 0.010
(0.117) (0.117)
Forward 0.846nnn
(0.131)
Forward JV 0.701n
(0.370)
Forward 100% for 0.839nnn
(0.158)
Backward 0.486nn
(0.213)
Backward JV 0.638nn
(0.278)
Backward 100% for 0.388
(0.240)
Sector controls
lnexp 0.005 0.005
(0.011) (0.011)
lnimp 0.001 0.001
(0.010) (0.010)
HHI4 0.085n 0.081n
(0.046) (0.047)
R2 0.031 0.031
Firms 4248 4248
Obs 10,144 10,144
Note: Each model is estimated using first differences and includes time, sector and province fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the sector-
time level are presented in parenthesis.
n po0.10.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0.01.
C. Newman et al. / European Economic Review 76 (2015) 168–187 181and the productivity of the downstream domestic producer. This is in contrast to the indirect spillover measure which
suggests that there are negative indirect externalities associated with a dominance of FDI firms upstream. Despite a large
theoretical literature proposing reasons as to why productivity spillovers through forward linkages might exist (see Section
2) there is little empirical evidence to suggest that they are an important source of productivity growth for domestic firms in
developing countries. Although some care should be exercised in inferring causality, our results suggest that, at least in the
Vietnamese case, forward linkages are a source of productivity growth. This is only so for domestic firms which are directly
linked with FDI firms through the supply chain.17 In contrast, we do not find any evidence to suggest that direct linkages
with downstream FDI customers are related to the productivity of domestic firms.
To quantify the magnitude of the contrasting effects of direct and indirect spillovers through the forward spillover
channel we focus on the interpretation of the negative coefficient on forward indirect spillovers in column (1) of Table 6 and
the positive coefficient on forward direct linkages in column (1) of Table 7. In the case of the former, the coefficient indicates
that a one percentage point increase in the proportion of inputs into a sector that are supplied by foreign-owned firms will,
on average, lead to a 0.00846 unit decrease in the level of productivity of firms in that sector.18 This is equivalent to a decline
in productivity of 0.6 per cent.19 Over the entire sample period indirect forward spillovers increased by 3.4 percentage
points. Our results suggest that, all else equal, this would lead to a reduction in productivity of 2.2 per cent. Given that
productivity over the period fell by 11.7 per cent for all firms this is not a negligible amount. The coefficient on forward
direct linkages in column (1) of Table 7 suggests that the average year-on-year change in productivity was 0.048 units, or 3.7
percentage points, higher for firms that have an FDI supplier. This should be considered alongside the fact that the average
year-on-year change in productivity was 0.02 for firms that do not have an FDI supplier. As such, while productivity was17 We also estimate the model including a range of interaction terms between the direct forward linkage measure and indicators of firm behaviour. We
find some evidence that the productivity impact of direct forward linkages is related to an expansion of products and varieties by downstream firms. This
(tentatively) suggests that one channel through which purchasing inputs from foreign-owned firms impacts on productivity is that it leads to within-firm
changes in the types of products produced. Results (not presented) are available on request.
18 We divide the coefficient by 100 due to the way in which the indirect forward spillovers measure is constructed. The estimated coefficient captures
the impact of a one unit increase in the indirect forward spillover measure on the average change in the productivity level of firms. A one unit increase in
the indirect forward spillover measure is equivalent to a 100 percentage point increase in the proportion of inputs supplied by foreign-owned firms. We
divide by 100 to get a one percentage point increase.
19 In comparison, the positive coefficient on the indirect backward spillover measures suggests that a one percentage point increase in the proportion
of FDI firms in downstream sectors, all else equal, would lead to a 0.4 per cent increase in productivity.
Table 7
Impact of direct FDI linkages on productivity and interaction with indirect spillovers.
(1) (2) (3)
Direct linkages
Forward Linkage 0.048nn 0.049nn 0.046nn
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Backward linkage 0.002 0.003 0.017
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018)
Indirect spillovers
Horizontal 0.009 0.005
(0.114) (0.116)
Forward 0.896nnn
(0.160)
Forward JV 0.688
(0.427)
Forward 100% for 0.916nnn
(0.185)
Backward 0.437n
(0.231)
Backward JV 0.446
(0.313)
Backward 100% for 0.426n
(0.256)
Spillovers interactions
For: Linkage Spillover 0.253
(0.254)
For JV: Linkage Spillover 0.045
(0.591)
For 100: Linkage Spillover 0.357
(0.291)
Back: Linkage Spillover 0.245
(0.343)
Back JV: Linkage Spillover 0.742n
(0.426)
Back 100: Linkage Spillover 0.052
(0.376)
R2 0.025 0.031 0.032
Firms 4248 4248 4248
Obs 10,144 10,144 10,144
Note: Each model is estimated using first differences and includes time, sector and province fixed effects. Time varying sector-levelcontrol variables
included in Table 5 are also included here but are not presented for ease of exposition. They are available on request. Robust standard errors clustered at the
sector-time level are presented in parenthesis.
n po0.10.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0.01
C. Newman et al. / European Economic Review 76 (2015) 168–187182declining for firms that were not supplied by an FDI firm, it was increasing for those firms that were. This suggests that
spillovers through direct linkages are an important source of productivity growth.
We extend the model to consider the impact of the interaction between being directly linked with foreign firms along
the supply and the indirect FDI spillover measure. This allows us to consider to what extent the effect of the traditional
spillover measures is due to direct linkages or indirect effects. We estimate the model given in Eq. (17a) which includes
interactions between the traditional spillover measures and the firm specific linkage measures. The results are presented in
column 2 of Table 7 for FDI spillovers as a whole and in column 3 for FDI spillovers disaggregated by joint venture and
wholly foreign-owned firms. The interaction terms are not well determined in either case.20 We do not find any evidence
that the negative indirect spillover associated with a dominance of upstream foreign-owned firms is mitigated by being
directly supplied by these firms, although the positive productivity impact through the direct linkage channel remains.
In Table 8 we disaggregate the direct linkages between firms along the supply chain by whether or not they are
associated with a transfer of technology (Eqs. (16b) and (17b)). As revealed in column 1 the positive productivity association
with having FDI suppliers (i.e. a forward direct linkage) is not associated with receiving technology transfers from upstream
firms. Positive impacts on productivity through direct linkages with upstream firms may be due to a number of other factors
as discussed in Section 2. For example, they could emerge from the possibility that inputs from foreign firms embody better
technology or are of a higher quality (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Girma et al., 2008), or that inputs from foreign firms are20 In column 3 we find some, albeit weak, evidence that the positive spillover from joint venture FDI firms is associated with firms that are directly
linked with domestic customers. The coefficient on the interaction term is only marginally significant, however, and so we do not place much weight on
this finding.
Table 8
Impact of direct FDI linkages on productivity and interaction with indirect spillovers – accounting for technology transfers.
(1) (2) (3)
Direct linkages
Forward linkage with tech transfer 0.039 0.040 0.030
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
Forward linkage no tech transfer 0.055nn 0.057nn 0.059nn
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Backward linkage with tech transfer 0.006 0.006 0.007
(0.027) (0.027) (0.031)
Backward linkage no tech transfer 0.001 0.002 0.020
(0.018) (0.017) (0.020)
Indirect spillovers
Horizontal 0.009 0.001
(0.115) (0.116)
Forward 0.898nnn
(0.161)
Forward JV 0.687
(0.428)
Forward 100% for 0.921nnn
(0.187)
Backward 0.436n
(0.231)
Backward JV 0.444
(0.314)
Backward 100% for 0.426n
(0.258)
Spillovers interactions
For: linkage with tech transfer spillover 0.356
(0.272)
For: Linkage no Tech Transfer spillover 0.149
(0.302)
For JV: Linkage with Tech Transfer spillover 0.492
(0.584)
For 100: Linkage with tech transfer spillover 0.602nn
(0.281)
For JV: Linkage no tech transfer spillover 0.287
(0.707)
For 100 Linkage no tech transfer spillover 0.109
(0.350)
Back: Linkage with tech transfer spillover 0.330
(0.596)
Back: Linkage no tech transfer spillover 0.202
(0.334)
Back JV: Linkage with tech transfer spillover 0.344
(0.699)
Back 100: Linkage with tech transfer spillover 0.331
(0.713)
Back JV: Linkage no tech transfer spillover 0.887n
(0.492)
Back 100: Linkage no tech transfer spillover 0.213
(0.358)
R2 0.025 0.031 0.032
Firms 4248 4248 4248
Obs 10,144 10,144 10,144
Note: As in Table 7.
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Our findings suggest that, in the Vietnamese case, it is not due to a deliberate transfer of new technology or know-how from
the FDI firm.
In columns 2 and 3 of Table 8 we include interaction terms between the direct linkage and technology transfer measures
and the FDI spillover measures. None of the interaction terms are well determined in column 2. Once we disaggregate by
type of FDI spillover, joint venture and wholly foreign owned, we find that having a direct link with an upstream FDI firm,
associated with a technology transfer, mitigates to a certain extent the negative indirect externality, associated with a
dominance of wholly-foreign owned firms in upstream sectors. In particular, a one percentage point increase in the
proportion of inputs supplied by wholly-foreign owned firms in upstream sectors is associated with a decline in productivity
of 0.7 per cent for firms with no linkages. Firms with linkages that include technology transfers experience significantly less
C. Newman et al. / European Economic Review 76 (2015) 168–187184of a decline in productivity equivalent to 0.2 per cent. A large part of the negative indirect spillover remains unexplained
empirically and could be attributed to one of the many theoretical arguments put forward for the existence of negative FDI
spillovers from a dominance of upstream FDI firms to downstream domestic sectors.
One hypothesis that fits well with our findings is that the negative indirect spillover from upstream FDI is due to FDI
firms gaining a dominant market position in upstream sectors leading to less competition and generally higher priced inputs
for domestic downstream producers. The negative effect is significantly reduced for domestic downstream producers which
receive inputs directly from FDI firms and where these linkages are associated with direct transfers of technology. In
contrast, we find very little evidence to suggest that spillovers from downstream FDI firms are due to direct linkages. One
possible explanation is that in Vietnam foreign firms are most dominant in ‘input’ sectors where there are likely to be
forward linkages. For example, as illustrated in Table 1, foreign firms dominate the equipment sectors which include
computers and electronics, electrical equipment, transportation and other types of machinery, all sectors with forward
linkage characteristics as per Hirschman (1958). Our findings suggest that firms directly linked with foreign firms in these
sectors experience direct productivity spillovers through this link. FDI firms are much less dominant in downstream sectors
that are more associated with the production of final goods, such as food products, wood and paper products and
pharmaceuticals. This reduces the potential for backward spillovers through direct linkages (Hirschman, 1958).21
Overall, our results for indirect vertical spillovers from FDI are consistent with findings in other empirical studies of this
kind. Our key point of departure is that we find evidence that domestic firms that are directly linked with upstream firms
experience an additional positive productivity impact not captured by the indirect spillover measure. We also find some
evidence that part of the negative indirect forward spillover is mitigated by positive direct spillovers through linkages. These
findings support the Giroud et al. (2012) critique of the indirect spillover measure. Arguably, the standard sector-level
measures used in the literature do not account for the effects of linkages or technology transfers that we capture here
through the firm-specific measures.
5.3. Robustness checks
Table 9 presents findings from two robustness checks. In column 1 we highlight the core results from the main models
presented in Tables 6–8. In column 2 we present results when we include controls for the sector-level concentration. The
rationale for this robustness check is that we only have data on the value of inputs and outputs and so cannot estimate
physical productivity. This implies that using our measure, productivity changes will embody both within-firm efficiency
gains and changes in prices and/or mark-ups that cannot be easily disentangled. By focusing on the productivity effects in
competitive sectors, where mark-ups are lower, we attenuate the possibility that the observed productivity effects are due to
changes in mark-ups as opposed to real productivity improvements (Amiti and Konings, 2007). Our second stage empirical
model is adapted to take account of sector-level concentration through the inclusion of interaction terms between the
various measures of FDI spillovers and linkages and the HHI. The results presented in column 2 of Table 9 show the
relationship between indirect/direct FDI spillovers and the productivity of firms in competitive sectors. In column 3 we
report the findings when we estimate productivity using Olley and Pakes (1996) approach.
Our robustness tests confirm our core results. We find evidence for negative indirect forward spillovers in all cases. We
also find that direct forward linkages are productivity enhancing. Evidence for positive indirect backward FDI spillovers from
joint venture foreign-owned firms is also confirmed in all models. The interaction between direct forward linkages with
technology transfers and indirect forward spillovers from wholly-foreign owned firms is positive and statistically significant
when we control for concentration but is not well determined when we use the OP productivity measure. It is interesting to
note that in no case are direct backward linkages well determined confirming our finding that direct spillovers through this
channel appear to be non-existent.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we explored the impact of FDI on the productivity of domestic firms in Vietnam. The analysis specifically
addressed whether foreign investment leads to productivity spillovers, and the extent to which these spillovers are due to direct
linkages, real technology transfers or other indirect effects. Focus was on vertical linkages through the supply chain from upstream
foreign-invested firms (supplying inputs to downstream domestic firms) and from downstream foreign-invested firms
(purchasing inputs from domestic firms). We also considered whether spillovers from wholly foreign-owned firms are different
to those from joint ventures.21 Another possible explanation relates to the bargaining power of the domestic firm in the negotiation of the terms of the transaction with the foreign
enterprises. Where the FDI firm is the customer and the domestic input supply sector is competitive, the foreign-owned customer is likely to have more
bargaining power than the domestic firm and so technology transfers and other potential spillovers will be accounted for in the price the foreign firms
negotiate for the inputs they buy. The bargaining power of the foreign-owned customers will be further strengthened where there are import substitutes
available. In contrast, when the Vietnamese firm is the customer purchasing inputs from an FDI firm they arguably have more bargaining power and as
domestic firms will have more information about the local market. As such they are in a better position to negotiate more favourable contract terms. This
has the potential to lead to productivity gains (such as embodied technologies or support services, for example) over and above that which they pay for in
the price of the inputs.
Table 9
Robustness checks.
Result (1) Main model (2) Controlling for HHIa (3) Olley-Pakes
Table 6: Indirect spillovers
Forward nnn nnn nnn
Forward JV n n þ(p¼0.277)
Forward 100% for nnn nnn nnn
Backward þnn þnn þ(p¼0.277)
Backward JV þnn þnn þnnn
Backward 100% for þ(p¼0.108) þn (p¼0.525)
Table 7 (column 3):
Direct linkages
Forward linkage þnn þnn þn
Backward linkage þ(p¼0.357) þ(p¼0.366) þ(p¼0.223)
Indirect spillovers
Forward JV (p¼0.109) (p¼0.133) þ(p¼0.410)
Forward 100% for nnn nnn nnn
Backward JV þ(p¼0.156) þ(p¼0.143) þnnn
Backward 100% for þn þn þ(p¼0.970)
Interactions
For JV: Linkage spillover (p¼0.940) (p¼0.843) þ(p¼0.767)
For 100: Linkage spillover þ(p¼0.222) þ(p¼0.247) þ(p¼0.361)
Back JV: Linkage spillover þn þn þ(p¼0.376)
Back 100: Linkage spillover (p¼0.890) (p¼0.887) (p¼0.155)
Table 8 (column 3)
Direct linkages
Forward linkage with tech transfer þ(p¼0.249) þ(p¼0.270) þ(p¼0.248)
Forward linkage no tech transfer þnn þnn þn
Backward linkage with tech transfer þ(p¼0.832) þ(p¼0.808) þ(p¼0.717)
Backward linkage no tech transfer þ(p¼0.321) þ(p¼0.392) þ(p¼0.212)
Indirect spillovers
Forward JV (p¼0.111) (p¼0.158) þ(p¼0.416)
Forward 100% for nnn nnn nnn
Backward JV þ(p¼0.160) þ(p¼0.163) þnnn
Backward 100% for þn þn þ(p¼0.962)
Interactions
For JV: linkage with tech spillover (p¼0.401) (p¼0.327) (p¼0.392)
For JV: Linkage no tech spillover þ(p¼0.685) þ(p¼0.757) þ(p¼0.440)
For 100: Linkage with Tech spillover þnn þnn þ(p¼0.266)
For 100: Linkage no tech spillover þ(p¼0.757) þ(p¼0.775) þ(p¼0.356)
Back JV: Linkage with tech spillover þ(p¼0.623) þ(p¼0.481) þ(p¼0.741)
Back JV: Linkage no tech spillover þn þ(p¼0.108) þ(p¼0.480)
Back 100: Linkage with tech spillover þ(p¼0.643) þ(p¼0.569) (p¼0.900)
Back 100: Linkage no tech spillover (p¼0.553) (p¼0.766) n
a By including interaction terms between each variable and the measure of sector-levelconcentration (HHI) we can isolate the impact of spillovers and
linkages in competitive sectors. Any observed effects in competitive sectors are likely to be due to real productivity improvements rather than increases in
mark-ups.
n po0.10.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0.01.
C. Newman et al. / European Economic Review 76 (2015) 168–187 185Our paper makes a novel contribution to the literature by disentangling direct spillovers through linkages from indirect
spillover effects of FDI. Arrow (1969) highlights that knowledge diffusion often requires direct (inter-personal) interaction and
that knowledge diffusion is not an automatic process. To arrive at a clearer picture of overall knowledge/technology transfers,
research is therefore needed to understand better the respective mechanisms behind spillovers through direct linkages and
indirect spillover effects of FDI. Arguably, treating these concepts separately in empirical studies may yield insights to better
understand the heterogeneous country effects of FDI knowledge/technology transfers found in the literature.
Overall, our results suggest that spillovers are more likely through vertical than through horizontal spillovers. Consistent
with other empirical findings we found evidence of (i) positive spillovers from downstream FDI firms, in particular joint
venture FDI firms, to domestic input suppliers, and (ii) negative spillovers from upstream FDI firms to downstream domestic
producers. More importantly, once we considered direct linkages between firms we found that domestic firms experience
positive productivity spillovers through their direct linkages with upstream FDI suppliers of inputs. This effect is not
captured by indirect spillover measures. Our results also suggest that the negative spillovers from wholly foreign-owned
firms in upstream sectors are less for domestic firms directly linked with foreign input suppliers where these links are
associated with technology transfers.
C. Newman et al. / European Economic Review 76 (2015) 168–187186Our findings provide new evidence on the interaction between FDI and private domestic firms which can help inform
the debate on the desirability of attracting FDI. The results of our investigation show that while there are indirect spillovers
associated with FDI that provide benefits beyond those internalized through market transactions, a large part of the
spillover from FDI, particularly forward spillovers, accrues to firms which are directly linked to FDI input suppliers. This
implies that policies aimed at attracting FDI should be continued – but also that they should be coupled with supporting
improved conditions for the direct transfer of knowledge between firms.Acknowledgements
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TCS sample disaggregated by manufacturing sectors (2-digit).
(1) Full
sample
(2)
2009
(3)
2010
(4)
2011
(5)
2012
(6) Private
domestic
total
(7) Private domestic
with productivity
estimate
10: Manufacture of food products 10 and 11 merged for
productivity estimation
3553 852 925 919 857 2998 2148
11: Manufacture of beverages 375 91 96 100 88 289 190
13: Manufacture of textiles 998 253 243 264 238 640 490
14: Manufacture of wearing apparel 1813 455 451 481 426 1041 650
15: Manufacture of leather and related
products
429 159 161 58 51 213 150
16: Manufacture of wood and products of
wood and cork
1656 394 419 441 402 1528 1148
17: Manufacture of paper and paper
products
1303 319 329 341 314 1101 793
18: Printing and reproduction of recorded
media
564 139 149 147 129 423 270
20: Manufacture of chemicals and
chemical products
20 and 21 merged for
productivity estimation
1009 247 254 258 250 592 424
21: Manufacture of pharmaceuticals,
medicinal chemical and botanical
products
259 65 64 67 63 137 90
22: Manufacture of rubber and plastics
products
2183 562 542 558 521 1345 958
23: Manufacture of other non-metallic
mineral products
2550 607 640 679 624 2280 1556
24: Manufacture of basic metals 24 and 25 merged for
productivity estimation
676 163 167 183 163 570 376
25: Manufacture of fabricated metal
products, except machinery and
equipment
2575 627 658 673 617 1911 1304
26: Manufacture of computer, electronic
and optical products
27, 28 and 29 merged for
productivity estimation
269 69 72 67 61 100 55
27: Manufacture of electrical equipment 573 135 147 148 143 308 198
28: Manufacture of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
584 150 146 153 135 468 318
29: Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers
and semi-trailers
29, 30 and 32 merged for
productivity estimation
221 44 56 63 58 89 55
30: Manufacture of other transport
equipment
513 146 132 134 101 313 205
32: Other manufacturing 538 142 138 135 123 171 106
31: Manufacture of furniture 1744 389 433 483 439 1339 963
Note: Sector 12, Manufacture of tobacco products and sector 19, manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products are excluded due to the very small
number of firms operating in this sector in Vietnam.
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